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Abstract 
The paper analyses the impact of regional own-ethnic concentration on the language proficiency 
of immigrants. It solves the endogeneity of immigrants’ location choices by exploiting the fact 
that guest-workers in Germany after WWII were initially placed by firms and labor agencies. We 
find a robust negative effect of ethnic concentration on immigrants’ language ability. Simulation 
results of a simultaneous location and learning choice model confirm the presence of the effect 
and show how immigrants with high learning cost select into ethnic enclaves. Under the counter-
factual scenario of a regionally equal distribution of immigrants the share of German-speakers 
increases only modestly. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Paper analysiert die Wirkung von regionalen ethnischen Konzentrationen auf die 
Sprachkompetenz von Einwanderern. Wir lösen die Endogenität der Wohnortentscheidungen 
der Einwanderer in dem wir den Umstand nutzen, dass Einwanderer im Rahmen der Gastarbei-
teranwerbung ihren ersten Arbeitsort nicht auswählen konnten. Wir finden belastbare negative 
Effekte der ethnischen Konzentration auf die Beherrschung der deutschen Sprache. Simulati-
onsergebnisse eines Modells mit gleichzeitigen Lern- und Wohnortentscheidungen unterstützen 
diesen Befund und zeigen, dass Einwanderer mit hohen Lernkosten gezielt in ethnische Enkla-
ven ziehen. Unter dem Szenario einer Gleichverteilung der Einwanderer über Deutschland wür-
de sich der Anteil der deutsch sprechenden Einwanderer nur geringfügig erhöhen. 
 
JEL classification: J61, R23, F22 
 
Keywords: Enclave, ethnic concentration, language proficiency, immigrants, instrumental vari-
able, random utility mode 
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1. Introduction 
Immigration and the social and economic performance of immigrants have been controversial 
policy issues for decades, both in North America and Europe. From the immigrants’ perspective, 
leaving behind a familiar social context and adapting to a new environment can be challenging; 
however, the experience is exacerbated if immigrants do not succeed in integrating into the host 
country’s society, a state often associated with the failure to learn the majority language. The 
existence of segregated “parallel” societies which are said to be characterised by poverty risk 
and unemployment, has fueled the debate on the integration of immigrants in many countries—
and among them Germany, the country with the largest immigrant population in Europe. An of-
ten articulated political concern refers to immigrant groups forming self-sufficient enclaves and 
thus challenging the life-style as well as formal or informal institutions of native societies. In 
Germany, those fears may be related to the official denial of being a country of immigration until 
recently1, despite the fact that 10 percent of the population is classified as foreign.  
The scope of this paper is to analyse the effect of regional ethnic concentration on the language 
proficiency of immigrants. The empirical analysis is based on the quasi natural experiment gen-
erated by the specific nature of guest-worker immigrants to Germany after WWII. By exploiting 
the fact that immigrants were exogenously placed in firms across West Germany, we estimate 
the causal effect of own-ethnicity concentration on a basic type of human capital, namely Ger-
man speaking and writing proficiency. By merging several representative data sets and address-
ing potential endogeneity bias with an IV approach we provide robust evidence of a small nega-
tive effect from ethnic concentration on language fluency. Similar questions have been ad-
dressed for other large-scale immigration countries like the USA, Australia and Canada; how-
ever, none of these studies can solve the problem of endogenous self-selection of migrants by 
using a quasi randomized placement of migrants in neighbourhoods.  
The economic consequences of immigrants’ language command have been studied intensively 
and for many countries (see for example Chiswick and Miller (2002) and (2005) and Bleakley 
and Chin (2004) for the USA, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for the UK, Dustmann (1994) and 
Dustmann and van Soest (2001) and (2002) for Germany, and Chiswick and Miller (1995) for 
Australia). Comparing the “fluency penalty” across the cited articles is complicated by differ-
ences in immigration histories (e.g., rates of return migration), and by differences in methodolo-
gies including the survey instrument to investigate self-assessed language proficiency (e.g., the 
U.S. and Australian censuses distinguish between four levels of English proficiency, whereas 
the German GSOEP data have five levels); however, the entire literature confirms that immi-
grants with good speaking and writing abilities perform better in the labour market in terms of 
employment and earnings compared to immigrants who speak and write poorly.  
                                                
1 “Germany is not an immigration country.” was the leading principle for immigration and “foreigner”-
policies in the coalition contract between conservatives and liberal democrats in 1982 (Herbert, 2001, 
pp. 247-248). See also the essay “Integration ist machbar” by Bade in the daily newspaper Die Welt 
(2009).  
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Another strand of the immigration literature has focused on the influence of ethnic enclaves on 
economic performance and/or language fluency. Theoretical arguments for the influence of eth-
nic capital and its transmission through neighbourhoods on immigrants’ performance have been 
made by Borjas (1995) and (1998). Most studies that we are aware of find a negative associa-
tion between ethnic concentration and language proficiency (Cutler et al. (2008), Chiswick and 
Miller (2005), Lazear (1999) for the USA, Warman (2007) for Canada, and Dustmann and Fabbri 
(2003) for the UK, and Chiswick and Miller (1996) for Australia). Only the paper by Cutler et al. 
(2008) attempts to correct for the potential self-selection of immigrants into specific neighbour-
hoods (ghettos) by using an occupational instrument matrix; however, occupation, location and 
language choice might be parts of the same decision. For Germany, no study analyses the link 
between ethnic concentration and language proficiency.2 The cited papers vary substantially in 
the size of the regions for which ethnic concentrations are defined, but the negative effect is 
consistently stronger when the regions are defined on less aggregated levels. If immigrants who 
are less willing or able to learn a language cluster in local neighbourhoods and counties this 
finding is not surprising.  
Stronger identification attempts have been made in studies estimating the effect of ethnic con-
centration on earnings. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) use instruments pertaining to the administra-
tion and topography of the regions, such as public finance, the number of local governments and 
rivers in US metropolitan statistical units, and find negative effects of segregation for African-
Americans. The authors are the first to seriously address the issue of endogenous selection of 
migrants; however, it seems at least debatable whether the structure of past public finance is 
sufficiently exogenous to the destination choice of immigrants in the face of long-term ghettoisa-
tion trends. In order to reduce the extent of mobility across metropolitan areas the authors limit 
their analysis to African-Americans aged 20 to 30—a strategy that might introduce other biases 
when focusing on outcomes that pertain to the transition period between education and labour 
market. Policies concerning the exogenous placement of asylum seekers in specific municipali-
ties have provided natural experiments for two small Scandinavian countries. Damm (2009) and 
Edin et al. (2003) use the initial exogenous placement of refugees in Denmark and Sweden to 
instrument for current exposure to their own ethnic group. The latter two studies have so far 
most convincingly solved the problem of self-selection, however, it should be noted that asylum 
seekers may differ from labour migrants with respect to background and behaviour. Edin et al. 
find that living in enclaves improves earnings of less skilled refugees while no significant effect 
pertains for those with more than 10 years of education. Damm finds that higher ethnic concen-
trations increase earnings irrespective of skill levels. 
This paper combines the latter two strands of literature by using an initially exogenous place-
ment policy of labour migrants in order to instrument the effect of regional ethnic composition on 
language ability. Apart from being the first study that can provide evidence from a natural ex-
                                                
2 Sociological research has dealt with the neighbourhood quality of ethnic clusters in Germany (Drever, 
2004). 
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periment in a large traditional immigration country, our paper adds to the literature a learning 
and location choice model which yields testable implications for the link between ethnic concen-
tration and language proficiency, and which is able to explain why studies on the effect of en-
claves on earnings remain contradictory. Furthermore, the model allows simulating counterfac-
tual outcomes for changes in regional ethnic concentration or average immigrant characteristics. 
This exercise is informative for gauging the impact of potential future immigration and is illus-
trated with the example of Germany fully opening her labour market for the Central and Eastern 
European countries of the EU in 2011.  
The paper focuses on the language skills of immigrants for the following reasons: 
▪ Language skills are a crucial part of the human capital endowment of an immigrant and the 
employment and earnings implications are well documented (see below). By looking at lan-
guage as an endogenous variable we dissect one of the proximate determinants of labour 
market outcomes.3 
▪ If the costs of learning German are of a non-monetary nature (e.g., effort) while benefits are 
largely reflected in wages, the assumption of a monotonic and continuous dependency of 
wages on ethnic concentrations might give rise to misspecifications, as will be shown in the 
next section. 
▪ The benefits of having a good command of German extend to many areas outside the labour 
market (e.g., participation in the civil society or use of health care) and have been used to 
measure successful integration of immigrants.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we set up our simple learning and loca-
tion choice model. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the guest-worker programme in Germany 
and underlines specific characteristics that resulted in exogenous placement of immigrants 
across German regions. Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the identification strategy 
used throughout the paper, a description of data sources as well as a discussion of the choice of 
the regional aggregation level. Section 5 provides the results from the econometric analyses. 
Section 6 discusses potential explanations for the difference in OLS and IV estimates as well as 
the potential bias from measurement error. Section 7 contains some brief policy simulations 
based on our structural model, while Section 8 concludes. 
2. Theory 
In this section, we turn to the random utility model which derives location and learning choice 
probabilities through utility maximizing behavior. Suppose learning German is costly, and the 
cost of immigrant i can be described by some observable characteristics iX , a vector of parame-
                                                
3 It should, however, be noted that ethnic enclaves may provide alternative, but often low paid service 
sector opportunities. 
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ters β , and an unobservable component ε, such as ability, which is assumed to be continuous 
and which we allow, but do not require, to differ across regions j. Assuming the cost to be linear 
in variables we write: 
j
ii
j
i Xc εβ +′=          (1) 
We assume that an immigrant enjoys some benefit from the number or share of people he can 
interact with. An example is the model by Lazear (1999), in which two people in a region are 
matched randomly and trade occurs with a fixed payoff if both can interact, that is, speak the 
same language. In this case the benefit would be the expected payoff before a match occurs 
and it would be linear in the share of people an agent can interact with. For the moment we just 
use a generic function )( jxξ  where jx  equals the fraction of people the immigrant can interact 
with in location j, so that jx  takes the value jfx  if the immigrant does not speak German (the 
subscript f standing for foreign) and jn
j
f xx +  if he speaks German (n standing for native). The 
shares of natives and all foreigner groups (denoted by an indexing set F) have to sum to 1: 
1=+
∈Fz
j
z
j
n xx   .0, ≥
j
z
j
n xx       (2) 
Different locations are then characterised by: 
1. variables differing across locations but equal for all immigrants in that 
     location, jW , 
2. variables characterizing the ethnic concentration, jn
j
f xx ,  which differ 
    across locations and across immigrant groups (but not across immigrants of the same 
    country of origin), 
3. an unobservable, continuously distributed component jir . 
 
Denoting by iS  an indicator taking on the value of one, if the immigrant learns German, and zero 
otherwise, utility of choosing S and location j for a given immigrant i is thus: 
j
ii
j
ij
j
fii
j
f
j
nijSi SrWxSXxxSU εγξβξ −+′+−+′−+= )(*)1())((*),(,   (3) 
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The first term describes the deterministic part (from the point of the econometrician) of utility 
from learning German. The immigrant can interact with both natives and immigrants of his own 
group, but incurs the cost βiX ′ . The second term is the utility enjoyed by interacting with other 
members of the immigrant group only. The term jij rW +′γ  describes the utility specific to the 
region for the immigrant, regardless of whether or not he learns German, and the last term is an 
unobservable part of the cost of learning German. The choice set consists of all unordered dis-
tinct pairs of ),( jS  and the chosen alternative is 
}{maxarg*)*,( ),(
},1,0{
js
Jjs
UjS
∈∈
=         (4) 
Equation (4) simply states that learning and location decisions are part of the same choice, a 
fact that was acknowledged but not formalised earlier by Lazear (1999) and Bauer et al. (2005). 
   
For notational simplicity, denote the observable part of utility by  
 
γξ
γβξ
j
j
fji
ji
j
f
j
nji
WxV
WXxxV
′+=
′+′−+=
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)(
),0(,
),1(,
 
 
and the composite error term jii
j
i Sr ε−  by ),(, jSiω . Omitting the individual index, the probability 
of learning German and choosing location j is given by 
 
),,...,,,...,,(
)},1,0{(),1(
),0(),1(),0(),1()1,0()1,1(),1(
),1(),(),(),1(
JJjjj
jksksj
VVVVVV
jksVVPjSP
−−−+−−Φ=
≠∈∀−≥−== ωω
  (5) 
 
with ),1( jΦ (V) being the distribution function of ),,...,,( ),0(),1()1,0()1,1( JJ ωωωω  for ),1( jSP =  at V. 
The second equality is simply saying that the probability of choosing a particular ),( jS  is in-
creasing in the associated utility and decreasing in the observed utility of any other alternative. 
In order to be able to make statements about the reaction of learning probabilities to changes in 
the immigrant share within a region we need to introduce an assumption concerning the payoff 
function ξ : 
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Assumption 1.   )(xξ  is differentiable and strictly increasing in its argument.  
It follows: 
Proposition 1.    Let the choice problem of the immigrant be described by equations (2) and (3). 
Under assumption 1, and holding constant the shares of all immigrant groups other than f: 
1. 0)|1( ≤
∂
=∂
j
fx
jSP
 
2. 0),1( ≤
∂
=∂
j
fx
jSP
 
3. ,0)( ≤
∂
∂
j
fx
kP
 ,0)( ≥
∂
∂
j
fx
jP
 jk ≠  
4. 0)1( ≤
∂
=∂
j
fx
SP
 
with strict inequalities if ),( jsω  has strictly positive density everywhere. 
 
Proof: see Appendix.    
All of the inequalities above follow the same intuition: An increase of jfx  increases the observ-
able part of utility of only one choice, which is moving to j and not learning German. In particular, 
it leaves the utility of choice (S=1,j) unchanged, since the increased immigrant share just re-
places natives and does not change the interaction possibilities for a German-speaker. This ef-
fect is captured in the (-1+1) terms in the proof. Thus, all options including learning German are 
decreased in value relative to (S=0,j). Furthermore, since all choice probabilities other than 
P(S,j) are decreasing in ),( jSV , the probability of moving to any location jk ≠  is also decreasing. 
If we assume ξ  to be concave, the condition that a higher share of the own immigrant group f 
replace the respective share of natives can be relaxed. Furthermore, the results can be general-
ised to the case where jfx  and 
j
nx  stand for the absolute number of immigrants and natives in a 
region. At least in the latter case, concavity would not be an innocuous assumption if there exist 
externalities in benefits from x for some range, such as threshold values for the supply of certain 
goods and services. 
>> Figure 1 about here << 
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An interesting implication of the model arises when the costs of learning German are unob-
served (time and effort spent learning), but benefits are to some extent reflected in higher earn-
ings (see Figure 1). The earnings (solid line) of immigrants will then be increasing in the ethnic 
concentration for immigrant i for concentrations above a certain threshold value ixx >  with 
ix being the concentration of own group members at which immigrants stop to learn German. 
For all values below ix  the immigrant learns German and her earnings are invariant to 
],0[ ixx∈ . If ix  is smaller for less educated immigrants (they do not learn German even at low 
ethnic concentrations), empirical studies might find a positive concentration effect on earnings 
for less educated and no effect for better educated immigrants (which for example is found by 
Edin et al.), or might find inconclusive results. 
 
To compare the quantities in proposition 1, we need another assumption: 
 
Assumption 2.   The probability of learning German conditional on location j reaches 1 as jfx  
approaches zero:  
1)|1(lim
0
==
→
jSP
j
fx
 
 
Proposition 2.   Let the choice problem of the immigrant be described by equations (2) and (3). 
Under assumptions 1 and 2: 
j
f
j
f x
jSP
x
SP
∂
=∂
>
∂
=∂ )|1()1(
 
 
for small jfx  (
j
fx  approaching 0).  
 
Proof: see Appendix.  
Note that the “small” jfx  condition is sufficient, and less restrictive and/or alternative conditions 
can be found. For example, the inequality will hold if the marginal utility from contact with other 
people goes to infinity as the share of people one can interact with goes to 0, ∞=′
→
)(lim
0
x
x
ξ , or 
whenever 
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
≠≠
=
∂
∂≥=
∂
∂
jk
j
fjk
j
f
jSP
x
kPkSP
x
kP )|1()()|1()(  
 
The intuition of the proposition is that if the immigrant is limited to one location, he cannot “es-
cape” the incentive to learn German by moving to another location. Lowering the immigrant 
share in a location where it was low initially is not going to change the learning decision of the 
immigrant, since he can choose from a multitude of locations. 
The results are fairly general and do not require any distributional assumptions other than conti-
nuity on the ω . In particular, no covariance structure is assumed. To illustrate the working of the 
model we provide a short example. Let the ω  be independently (across choices and individuals) 
and identically distributed type I extreme value errors, resulting in the well-known multinomial 
logit model with the choice probabilities given by 
( ) +=
k
VV
V
kk
jS
ee
ejSP
),0(),1(
),(
),(        (6) 
 
Let ( ) ))((*)1()(*),( jfjfjnjS xSxxSV ξξ −++= , so that observable utility is given only by the 
composition of the population. Finally, let )ln()( xx =ξ . It is easy to verify that assumptions 1 
and 2 hold under this specification. We would have: 
)]4/1(),/1([
)(
)1(
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)]4/1(,1[
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It can be verified that  
j
f
xj
f
x x
SP
x
jSP
j
f
j
f ∂
=∂
<
∂
=∂
→→
)1(lim)|1(lim
00
 
The model is highly stylised to highlight the decision problem and the tradeoffs that immigrants 
face, and naturally it has some shortcomings. First, we accept the payoff function ξ  as a black-
box mechanism. Agents benefit from increased communication prospects with other agents, but 
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we do not link these benefits to any “deep” parameters or structures.4 A more serious problem 
might be the omission of moving costs. Here, we are mainly led by data restrictions in our deci-
sion not to model moving costs. The bottleneck in the empirical part is the number of immigrants 
in the German Socio-Economic Panel, with roughly 2,000 observations in 1985 and 1,000 ob-
servations in 2001. Very few of those move across regions, as we define them, and we cannot 
know for what reasons they change their location. Our conjecture is that moving costs would 
bring the marginal probabilities of learning German conditional and unconditional on location 
closer to each other, since “escaping” a region becomes more costly. 
While the working of the model as summarised above is instructive for understanding the choice 
situation and the trade-offs each immigrant faces as well as for thinking about counterfactuals, 
the estimation strategy should depend on the hypothesis to be tested. In the empirical section 
we aim at estimating  
j
fx
jSP
∂
=∂ )|1(
  
for its intuitive interpretation (as a treatment effect). Identification will rely on our assumption that 
initial placement and location choices for a certain time period after arrival in Germany were ex-
ogenous to immigrants with respect to their willingness/ability to learn German.    
A more holistic estimation (allowing for simultaneous learning and location choices of immi-
grants) of responses to different ethnic concentration counterfactuals will be carried out in the 
experiments section. Naturally, the latter will require more of the structure outlined above (and 
consequently will be more restrictive), but can be carried out without the use of instruments. 
Thus, it provides a robustness check of the direct estimation of the treatment effect.    
 
3. The Guest-Worker Programme in West Germany 1955-1973 
The 1950s and 60s in Germany have become known as the time of the „Wirtschaftswunder“ 
(economic miracle), an episode of rapid post-war reconstruction and economic growth. The 
miracle has been facilitated by an inflow of refugees from East Germany and territories formerly 
belonging to the German Reich or inhabited by a German-speaking population. As this inflow 
(8.3 million until 1950) ebbed off, labour shortages became evident, and between 1959 and 
1962 the number of vacancies overtook the number of people registered as unemployed. The 
guest-worker recruitment in Germany began with the German-Italian Recruitment Treaty signed 
                                                
4 While this could be done (Lazear (1999) being a possible starting point), it would be only of secondary 
interest in answering our research question. 
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in December 1955 to meet the hunger for labour of the German economy.5 Subsequent treaties 
were signed with Greece and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, and Yugoslavia 
in 1968.  
>> Figure 2 about here << 
Figure 2 shows the development of the share of the foreign population in Germany, where for-
eign is defined as not holding German citizenship. Until 1960 the presence of guest-workers was 
a marginal phenomenon, but we see that recruitment gained momentum in the early 60s and 
increased steadily until 1967. A dip in the share of foreign employees occurred in 1967 as the 
result of a brief recession, which however did not affect the further inflow of the foreign popula-
tion. Within 13 years, the share of foreign employees rose from less than one to twelve percent. 
Recruitment was halted in 1973 as a consequence of a more severe economic recession; how-
ever, the upward trend of the foreign population continued modestly due to family reunification.  
The composition of the foreign population has been subject to substantial changes, as seen in 
Figure 3. While Italians constituted the most numerous group of foreigners in 1969, the Turkish 
population overtook all other groups in 1971 and has been widening the gap ever since. Notably, 
the numbers of Turks never decreased after the recruitment stop, as it did for other guest-worker 
groups. 
>> Figure 3 about here << 
Technically, the recruitment was performed by a recruitment commission in the sending country 
which was jointly set up by the Federal Employment Agency of Germany and the Labour ad-
ministration of the sending country. German firms requested workers according to their needs 
and the commission assigned workers from an application pool to specific firms. Workers signed 
one-year contracts with their first employers at decentralised labour office branches before arriv-
ing in Germany. Permits to live in Germany for the duration of one year were issued, but the 
permission was conditional on employment with the employer of the contract. Accommodation 
and travel costs were covered by the employer, so that monetary and administrative costs of the 
application and the move were essentially zero for the guest-worker. The recruitment was de-
signed to attract workers with very low skill requirements. In Germany, most guest-workers be-
came employed in manufacturing, notably in the construction, mining, metal and ferrous indus-
tries. As of 1966, 72% of the foreign workforce comprised unskilled workers.  
                                                
5 The description of the recruitment history and its technicalities draws on Herbert (2001).   
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4. Identification  
The basic question we attempt to answer in this research is whether the ethnic composition in 
their neighbourhood negatively impacts on the language fluency of immigrants. We use the 
quasi-natural experiment of the guest-worker immigration that took mainly place in the 1960s 
and 1970s in order to establish a causal link between area composition and individual ability to 
speak and write German. Guest-workers were little educated and generally without any knowl-
edge of the German language upon arrival thus reducing the problem of selective migration.6 As 
guest-workers were contracted in their home countries based on the (mostly manual) labour 
demand of German firms and administered by outlets of the German Labour Office, migrants 
had no control over their placement in Germany.7 The idea is then to compare immigrants who 
were placed in areas with different ethnic compositions and thus with different incentives and 
costs to learn German. Those confronted with a high regional density of non-Germans will be 
less likely to require a good command of the host country language for their daily interactions. At 
the same time, they have fewer opportunities to learn from the interaction with German speak-
ers. The natural counterfactual for a person living in a cluster with a high concentration of own 
ethnic co-residents is a person of the same ethnicity in a low-concentration area. Comparing 
persons of the same ethnicity, levels out the potential bias from linguistic distances between 
languages. 
The ideal set-up of our investigation would be to have a data source with objective measures of 
language speaking and writing fluency for immigrants who were randomly distributed over Ger-
many without ever changing their place of residence. In this case, we could simply estimate the 
basic OLS model 
uysmxy +++++= μκγβα )(      (7) 
where y stands for language ability, x stands for ethnic concentration, (ysm) stands for exposure 
to the host country language (years since migration), κ are country of origin fixed effects, µ are 
regional fixed effects and u is a random error term. The estimated coefficient β would report the 
own-ethnic concentration effect which should carry a negative sign in case we expect ethnic 
concentration to inhibit learning German, that is if assumption (1) in the theory section holds.  
Data 
In order to estimate the causal effect of ethnic concentration on language fluency, this paper 
combines different data sources. As we are interested in language ability of individual immi-
grants, we make use of the guest-worker sample B of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
                                                
6 In a recent study on linguistic integration of immigrants in Germany, still more than 90 percent of Turkish 
immigrants responded that they had no usable German knowledge upon arrival (Rother, 2008). 
7 Given this procedure, the initial placement was exogenous to the guest-workers. From the perspective of 
family members moving to Germany in the framework of the family reunification, the location was also 
exogenous. 
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(GSOEP) which was started in 1984 and which provides detailed information on individual and 
household characteristics. This sample initially comprised 1,393 households with either a Greek, 
Italian, Spanish, Turkish, or Yugoslavian household head. Due to the limited sample size of the 
GSOEP we have to use administrative data in order to generate regional concentration meas-
ures of guest-workers. Unfortunately, the 1984 wave of the GSOEP does not allow sufficiently 
detailed regional merging with other data sources: instead we use the 1985 wave comprising 
2,346 immigrants with full information from the five most important guest-worker countries. 
The main outcome of interest is language knowledge. Like the previous literature we use indica-
tors of self-assessed language fluency and writing ability which are measured on a five-category 
ordinal Likert-scale ranging from “not speaking at all” (lowest category) to “speaking very well” 
(highest category).8 For most of the analysis, we use a binary variable for speaking and writing 
ability which takes on the value one for the two highest scores on the Likert scale and zero oth-
erwise. As can be seen from Table 1, less than half of the sample claimed to speak or write Ger-
man at least at a good level in 1985.  
>> Table 1 about here << 
Demographic information comprises gender, marital status, country of origin, age at migration, 
years since migration, years of schooling, a dummy variable for education abroad and a dummy 
indicating the presence of children in the household. Table 1 further reveals that the average 
immigrant entered Germany at relatively young age (23 years) and had spent almost 15 years in 
the country. Educational attainments are rather low (at nine years of schooling) which is consis-
tent with the fact that the vast majority of educational degrees was attained in the home country. 
The gender mix as well as the common presence of children in immigrant households reflect the 
migration for family unification, which became dominant after the recruitment stop in 1973. 
Given the scope of the guest-worker programme it might be surprising that the German govern-
ment never collected detailed information on where guest-workers moved and for how long they 
stayed, leaving us with general data sources. To generate ethnic concentration measures, we 
use the IAB9 Beschäftigtenstichprobe of 1975, a two percent sample of all persons with social 
security insurance in Germany. This employee-sample comprises 2% of the entire employee 
population plus recipients of certain social transfers like unemployment benefits. Employers 
mandatorily register employees for the payment of social security taxes, so that employees can 
be tracked through their social security numbers until dropping out of the labour force. 
                                                
8 Objective language measures are to date unavailable in Germany. The federal office for Migration and 
Integration initiated an “integration panel” which started in 2007 with a focus on the effect of language 
course participation on language ability. Again, no objective language evaluation was possible due to 
legal uncertainties and the absence of a coherent test scheme (Rother, 2008). 
9 The research institute affiliated with the Federal Employment Agency of Germany. 
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Instrumental variable approach 
Although the placement of immigrants in Germany was exogenous to them, they were in reality 
allowed to move after one year of work (including being allowed to return). However, until the 
economic recession in mid 1970s, guest-workers would move only to follow labour demand, and 
normally only short distances (i.e., within region). These moves must be understood as steps 
towards settling down in Germany, after many guest-workers had spent the first time in em-
ployer-provided accommodation. The fact that immigrants moved across regions might imply 
that the propensity to move into ethnically homogeneous regions (enclaves) is correlated with 
some unobservable characteristics of migrants. For instance, migrants who are less able or will-
ing to learn German could self-select into ethnic clusters in order to reduce the costs adherent to 
absent language skills. If this was the case we would expect naive OLS estimates of the enclave 
effect to be biased away from zero. 
To overcome this bias, we use an instrumental variable approach where we estimate the follow-
ing system of equations: 
ezx
uysmxy
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where z is the instrument which satisfies the assumptions Cov(z, x) ≠ 0 and Cov(z, u) = 0. The 
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can be interpreted as the ratio between the reduced form relationship between y and z over the 
first stage relationship of y and x. The main instrument used in this application is the ethnic 
composition of regions in 1975, thus ten years before our language ability measures were taken 
and at the time when the guest-worker programme had just come to an end. At this time, the 
placement of guest-workers was still predominantly exogenous to them, implying that z is uncor-
related with any unobservable factors that are accumulated in u.  
We identify the effect of ethnic concentration on language acquisition through the use of the ex-
ogenous 1975 ethnic composition as an instrument for ethnic concentrations in 1985, the earli-
est year for which we have a sample of immigrants with German proficiency and residence 
county information. The identifying assumption is that until 1975 the guest-workers have not 
changed their locations according to characteristics that are correlated with the ability or willing-
ness to learn German. We do not need to assume that guest-workers never moved, but that 
whatever influenced their moving decision (if they moved) was not correlated with unobservable 
characteristics influencing the learning decision. Given the economic boom until 1973 and the 
pervasively low levels of education and skills among the guest-workers, we do not expect much 
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sorting across regions until 1975; since transitions from one employer to another were most 
likely to happen within rather than across regions, it helps that regions are defined at a fairly 
aggregate level (discussed in the next section). 
Our instrument might contain measurement error, as we instrument the ethnic concentration 
exposure in 1985 with the regional concentration of 1975, although we cannot observe individual 
places of residence in 1975. This is potentially problematic if guest-workers have moved within 
this ten year period, and in consequence ethnic concentrations have become stronger for those 
who were not likely to learn German in the first place. Using data from the employee-sample of 
the IAB we investigate whether there are systematic differences in the exposure to ethnic con-
centration before and after moving across regions. 
We base our calculations on all guest-workers who were present in the sample in 1975 and in 
1984, and who “moved”; those are migrants who were registered for work (or benefit receipt) in 
different regions in 1975 and 1984. We base our analysis on the workplace location rather than 
residence, because of higher non-responses for the latter.10 We observe that 17% of the guest-
workers have moved across regions between 1975 and 1984, as compared to 14% of German 
nationals.11 Some but not the entire differential is due to the fact that the immigrants who moved 
were predominantly younger and male. Fifty two percent of those who moved turned to 
neighbouring regions. 
We also construct a variable DIFF defined on guest-workers who moved between 1975 and 
1984, which is the difference in the regional ethnic concentration that a guest-worker experi-
enced between 1975 and 1984. For example, if a Turk lived in Munich in 1975 and in Berlin in 
1984, DIFF would be the concentration of Turks in Berlin in 1984 minus the concentration of 
Turks in Munich in 1984. Thus, the change in concentration after moving cannot be attributed to 
differential trends in the overall population of different immigrant groups. Figure 4 plots the den-
sity distribution of changes in ethnic concentration (DIFF) of 2,523 guest-workers in the IAB 
sample who moved between 1975 and 1984. The distribution peaks around zero (the mean of 
DIFF being 0.0036) and has somewhat more mass to the right. For 54% of the movers the con-
centration of their own ethnic group changed by less than one percentage point and for 70% by 
less than 1.5 percentage points.  
>> Figure 4 about here << 
It could still be the case though, that guest-workers who moved to regions with lower concentra-
tions differ systematically from those who moved to higher concentration locations. We thus re-
gress the variable DIFF on educational attainment, age, and nationality dummies (all as reported 
in 1984). If systematic sorting was present, we would expect educational attainment and age to 
correlate (albeit imperfectly) with ability or willingness to learn German. For this test we group 
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the educational information in four categories, educ1 being education less than high-school 
(Gymnasium, qualifying for college) without vocational training, educ2 high-school degree or 
vocational training (but not both), educ3 high-school degree and vocational training, and educ4 
college degree.  
>> Table 2 about here << 
Table 2 reports these OLS results, with educ4 and the Greek dummy being the omitted catego-
ries. If anything, lower educational attainments show some weak correlation with a positive 
change in ethnic concentration, although none of the dummies is significant at conventional lev-
els. The size of coefficients is very small, and the mean change in concentrations for guest-
workers with the lowest education remains below two tenths of a percentage point when com-
pared to workers with college degrees. Age seems to be irrelevant. Turks and Yugoslavs were 
more likely to move to regions with higher concentrations, but here, too, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are modest. When we include interactions between ethnic and educational category 
dummies (column 2), even the ethnic dummies lose their significance (none of the interactions 
comes close to significance). In general, the variable DIFF is explained very poorly by the re-
gression, with R² not even reaching 0.02. We conclude that sorting of guest-workers along any 
observable characteristics has been absent or very modest between 1975 and 1985.  
 
To further test the validity of our instrument we also employ a second variable, the regional elec-
tion result of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the national elections of 1976. 
This instrument is sufficiently correlated with the 1985 ethnic composition of regions, as guest-
workers were predominantly placed in regions with dominant mining and heavy industry sectors, 
which were traditional strongholds of the SPD. Beyond the link through ethnic composition, the 
instrument is not correlated with individual language ability, as guest-workers were not entitled to 
vote in the national election unless having adopted German citizenship. At that time, this was 
true only for a negligible fraction of guest-workers and language knowledge was no criterion for 
the admission to German citizenship. Additionally, the political landscape in Germany largely 
ignored the fact that guest-workers were starting to settle down and that the intended „rotation 
principle“ of the migration flows (guest-workers should return after a first employment spell) 
never came into effect. Consequently, none of the political parties broached the issue of integra-
tion or language policy at that time. 
Choice of regional level of aggregation 
Conditional on data availability, ethnic concentrations can be measured at several levels of ag-
gregation. Ideally, the effect of ethnic concentration on language proficiency should be meas-
ured within geographic units containing people’s daily life context. Generally, there is a qualita-
                                                                                                                                                           
10 Reporting residence was not mandatory. 
11 When looking at inter-regional moves, the level of mobility seems low when compared to the USA. 
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tive trade-off between small units of aggregation that closely reflect the idea of ethnic 
neighbourhoods (e.g., census tracts in the US ghettoisation literature with an average size of 
three to five thousand inhabitants; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; or municipalities in Sweden with a 
median population size of 16,000 inhabitants; Edin, Frederiksson and Aslund, 2003) and larger 
units, that circumvent the potential bias from self-selection into neighbourhoods (e.g., through 
the use of metropolitan level data (CMA); Warman, 2007; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 2008). 
The latter approach assumes that the problematic self-selection of individuals into ethnic en-
claves mainly takes place within cities rather than across. In Germany, a reasonable level of 
aggregation contains cities with their economically integrated suburban areas, or counties in 
rural areas, amounting to average populations of 100,000 to 250,000. Unlike within American 
cities, the degree of ethnic and social segregation is much lower in Germany (see Musterd 
(2005)). Census tract units used in the American neighbourhood effects literature can thus be 
expected to reflect individuals’ space of interaction too narrowly for the German case. Our 
analysis is based on so-called Anpassungsschichten, which are regional units comprising a lar-
ger city and the economically linked hinterland. In West Germany including West Berlin, there 
were 111 Anpassungsschichten in 2001 with an average population size between 135 and 500 
thousand inhabitants, respectively. These units are broader than preferred, however, they are 
the lowest level of aggregation for which the Microcensus remains fully representative for minor-
ity nationalities. Since early waves of the Microcensus do not identify the Anpassungsschicht of 
the household, we use a 2% employee sample (IAB employee sample, see below) to project 
population shares for the same regional units for the years 1975 and 1985. Thus, the broad re-
gional aggregation has also the advantage of decreasing the degree of measurement error re-
sulting from projecting for the population. We wish to emphasize that this degree of aggregation 
will deliver more conservative estimates than when based on smaller regional units. Conse-
quently, we provide lower bound estimates of the true effect of ethnic concentration on the lan-
guage proficiency of immigrants. By including Anpassungsschicht and ethnicity fixed effects, we 
exploit only variation in ethnic concentrations that is not systematic across ethnicities or across 
regions. If the chosen level of aggregation effectively reduced the bias from sorting, our OLS 
estimates should be very close to the true effect of own-ethnic concentration.  
5. Results 
In the following we provide empirical evidence of a German language penalty from living among 
members of the same ethnicity which is robust when accounting for the endogeneity of immi-
grants’ post-initial-placement location choice. Figure 5 gives an initial idea of the correlation be-
tween ethnic concentration in the location of immigrants (here the log of the normalised fre-
quency) and their average language fluency in German (as a share of immigrants who speak 
German well or very well). The correlation between the two variables of interest is negative, with 
the variance across regions being substantial. It becomes evident that larger regions contain 
higher ethnic concentrations. 
>> Figure 5 about here << 
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Main results 
Table 3 indicates that there is a significantly negative return to language fluency from living in an 
area with higher own-ethnic concentration. When including control variables, the coefficient be-
comes more pronounced and is -0.037.12 Equivalently, if the ethnic concentration increases by 
one standard deviation, the probability that a person is fluent in German decreases by 2.6 per-
cent. Although the effect of own-ethnic concentration might seem small at first, one has to con-
sider the high level of aggregation it refers to. Other authors have found similar effects at high 
levels of aggregation for the USA (Chiswick and Miller, 2005) or Canada (Warman, 2007). The 
table further reports results from specification (2) which comprises an instrumental variable ap-
proach. The use of the instrument (in columns 3 and 4) returns a very similar coefficient, mod-
estly further from zero than our OLS estimate.13  
>> Table 3 about here << 
Table 4 reports results from the same estimations using writing fluency as the dependent vari-
able. Interestingly, the concentration effects are equally precisely measured when compared to 
Table 3, however, the effects are substantially closer to zero and significantly different thereof 
only in the IV estimation (columns 3 and 4). In Table 5, we repeat the analysis of speaking flu-
ency and test the robustness of our results by using alternative measures of ethnic concentra-
tion. Columns 1 and 4 use the absolute number of own-ethnic minority members, which simply 
reflects a transformation of our initial results (see also theory section). The remaining columns 
use alternative measures of ethnic concentrations. The dissimilarity index ranges between zero 
and one with the corner solution representing the state of perfectly equal distribution across 
space and the state of perfect concentration of all minority members in one region.14 The isola-
tion index is a measure ranging between zero and one which reflects the degree of isolation 
which an average member of an ethnicity faces on top of the equal distribution of this ethnicity 
across space.15 As can be seen from Table 5, our results are robust to the use of alternative 
measures of ethnic concentration or segregation; two-stage-least-squares estimators are consis-
tently more negative than the OLS estimates. 
>> Table 4 about here << 
                                                
12 The largest part of the effect stems from variation across regions (50 percent). Thirty-nine percent of 
the effect is due to variation across ethnicities.  
13 We also use a variety of transformations of this instrument (e.g., ranks) yielding qualitatively the same 
results. 
14 The formula for the Dissimilarity index is 
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>> Table 5 about here << 
In Table 6 we add further robustness concerning our dependent variable. So far, we have used 
a binary indicator for speaking and writing fluency. These variables are, however, generated 
from ordinal rankings of five answer categories. Columns 1 and 2 report basic results for OLS 
regressions that use the full information of the language self-assessment. Although the coeffi-
cients are hard to interpret, one can infer the robustness of our results from them.16 Columns 3 
to 6 use a transformed binary concentration measure that takes the value one if the ethnic con-
centration of an ethnicity in a region lies above the 75th percentile of the entire ethnic concentra-
tion distribution, and zero otherwise. Due to the loss of information, the precision of the estima-
tion in column 3 is lower compared to the one with continuous concentration measures. As col-
umn 4 shows the contact rate with natives might matter more for language acquisition than sim-
ply living in own-ethnicity enclaves. Although living with fewer Germans outside enclaves might 
be beneficial for language acquisition,17 the absence of native speakers inside enclaves has a 
strongly negative impact on language knowledge. Columns 5 and 6 report differential effects for 
older and younger migrants according to their age at migration. The comparison of both columns 
shows that older immigrants bear most of the negative impact from enclaves while those who 
immigrated at younger age have no disadvantage from living in an enclave; these results recon-
firm findings for other countries (Warman, 2007). The joint coefficient of a young immigrant in an 
enclave is significantly positive 0.092 (s.e. 0.049). 
>> Table 6 about here << 
Table 7 shows further instrumental variable estimation results. Given the relatively small sample 
size, we prefer the use of only one instrument. However, we have a second instrument at hand 
with which to test for over identification of the equation. Using only the second instrument—the 
election outcome for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in 1976—the 2SLS estima-
tor becomes even more negative. Employing both instruments at once we produce an over iden-
tified model: the estimated coefficient moves very close to our initial result and the Hanson test 
statistics confirms that our instruments satisfy the orthogonality condition. Even when introduc-
ing a number of interactions (column 4) we cannot clearly reject the null hypothesis that the in-
struments are invalid. Columns 5 and 6 produce the reduced form results for both instruments. 
>> Table 7 about here << 
>> Table 8 about here << 
                                                
16 The results are also robust to the use of ordered probit estimation. 
17 Generally, immigrants tend to have more social contacts with other immigrants irrespective of ethnicity. 
As a result, German might be the language of communication among immigrants from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds. 
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Table 8 adds evidence from a non-parametric perspective. We perform nearest neighbour pro-
pensity score matching to generate the closest counterfactuals of our observations artificially.18 
For two different binary treatment variables, the first line reports the result without matching. The 
remaining rows are different versions of the matching estimator employing different numbers of 
nearest neighbours. As evidenced in the table, applying the matching estimator increases the 
language ability of the control group, i.e. in the unmatched sample we underestimate the lan-
guage ability of those residing outside enclaves. Also, the average treatment effects are clearly 
significant, lending further robustness to our earlier results. 
6. Measurement Error 
The model estimated in (7) has several sources of potential measurement error which will be 
discussed in this section. More specifically, we wish to explain the fact that 2SLS estimates are 
more negative than standard OLS results. 
Models using language ability as an explanatory variable (e.g., in wage regressions) have dis-
cussed the measurement error inherent to self-assessed language knowledge (Dustmann and 
van Soest, 2001; Bleakley and Chin, 2004). Survey respondents might generally misjudge their 
language ability, and the deviation of self-assessed from “objective” fluency might be correlated 
with level of education (i.e., better educated might have a better idea of their true language abil-
ity) and level of language ability (i.e., those in the upper part of the fluency distribution have less 
room for over-estimating their ability with the reverse being true for the other extreme of the flu-
ency distribution).19 In our application, language fluency is, however, the dependent variable and 
measurement error herein reduces precision while it does not introduce any bias into the esti-
mates.  
More serious than in the dependent variable is measurement error in independent variables as it 
may bias the estimated coefficients. As such, this type of error might potentially drive OLS esti-
mates closer to zero and explain our finding of more negative 2SLS estimates. Our ethnic con-
centration measures are computed for five ethnicities (Greek, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, and 
Yugoslav) from the IAB Employee sample 1985 which comprises two percent of all individuals 
with social security insurance in Germany. It seems reasonable to assume that these densities 
suffer from measurement error, especially in regions which comprise a generally low share of 
foreign population or few individuals of one single ethnicity. In support of these measures, it 
should be noted that social security insurance was compulsory in Germany at that time (and still 
                                                
18 The matching estimators are well-fitted with full support. 
19 In our sample, there is a strong central tendency in the five category Likert scale with only 15 percent of 
respondents claiming to have no (category 1) or very good (category 5) language ability. 
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is) and that unemployed individuals are also included in the sample. Further, due to the demand-
driven nature of the guest-worker programme, ethnic minorities were more equally distributed 
across German regions than one would expect under more labour supply driven arrangements. 
As such, the extent of measurement error is probably not correlated with characteristics of the 
region other than size and thus should be of little concern in our estimation. 
Attenuation bias towards zero could be shown in our data when the instrument has better meas-
urement properties than the original density measures. In our case, this seems rather unlikely, 
as the instrument (ethnic concentration measured from IAB sample 1975) comes from the same 
data source as our original variable that is potentially plagued by measurement error. In order to 
show that this type of error is of less importance here, we use another instrument that does not 
suffer from the problem: The regional election outcomes of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of 
Germany in the year 1976. 
>> Table 9 about here << 
As both sources of measurement error seem not responsible for the observed outcome, we turn 
to a last potential solution. Given that the 2SLS estimates exploit only variation in ethnic concen-
tration across space and ethnicities that was present in 1975, while OLS estimates rely on the 
respective variation for 1985, a change in this variation might result in different outcomes. In 
other words, if the fluency penalty from ethnic concentration differs in the 1975 sample from the 
1985 population, OLS and 2SLS will differ for qualitative reasons (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). If 
immigrants moved across regions between 1975 and 1985 in a non-random fashion, our instru-
mental variable approach will only estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) for those 
who did not intend to move. A useful check whether “stayers” suffer stronger from ethnic con-
centration can be performed by exploiting information on the year when the immigrant house-
hold moved to the current place of residence. The full retrospective information is only available 
in the first wave of the GSOEP (1984) and that is why we lose some observations. As Table 9 
suggests, migrants who live longer at their current place of residence have much more negative 
coefficients on the ethnic concentration measures. It should be noted, that although this piece of 
evidence indicates that the language penalty differs with the propensity to have moved, it cannot 
answer the question whether people moved voluntarily (i.e., sorting) and whether they moved 
across regional units. However, if we did not account for  sorting of immigrants who were less 
willing or able (omitted variable x2) to learn German into ethnic enclaves (x1), then the ethnic 
concentration measure will overestimate the true penalty on learning German since x2 is ex-
pected to be negative for language fluency and Corr(x1, x2) > 0. When estimating a reduced form 
regression with the instrument rather than the ethnic concentration measure of 1985, we indeed 
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find a slightly lower coefficient of -0.030 instead of -0.037. While being present in our data, sort-
ing over time accounts for less than 20 percent of the coefficient. 
 
7. Policy Simulation  
The regressions reported in Section 5 and 6 aimed at identifying and quantifying the effect of 
ethnic concentrations on language proficiency. As we have discussed in the theoretical part of 
the paper, the effect of a rise in ethnic concentration on an immobile immigrant’s propensity to 
learn German (the case in the previous sections) will typically be different from the impact if the 
immigrant can move across regions. From a policy perspective the latter case is of more rele-
vance. Furthermore, we showed that changes in the concentration impact stronger on the loca-
tion conditioned probability of learning German as compared to the unconditional probability, at 
least for low fx .  
It is thus interesting to study how learning and location choices would have behaved under dif-
ferent scenarios of ethnic concentrations and individual characteristics. To this avail, we esti-
mate the model outlined in Section 2 as a multinomial choice model and use the estimated pa-
rameters to perform some model simulations on counterfactual distributions of immigrants 
across regions and educational attainments.  
We conduct this exercise on a more recent sample of immigrants (the 2001 wave of the 
GSOEP). Above we had used the 1985 wave of the panel to reduce as much measurement er-
ror in our instrument as possible. The experiments, however, are more relevant for recent data, 
because we now observe immigrants whose decisions to live in Germany have become perma-
nent and who arguably had the chance to settle in a region of their own choice.  
Multinomial Choice Model 
Recall that a choice alternative is given by a pair of learning and location decisions. If the jiω  in 
equation (5) are distributed type I extreme value, the choice probabilities are the ones given in 
equation (6), resulting in the well-known multinomial logit model. The properties of this model 
are discussed at length in McFadden (1974). The model is consistent with a globally concave 
likelihood function. Importantly, consistency is preserved when the estimation is performed on a 
subset of choice alternatives, a pivotal property when the choice-set for optimizing agents is very 
large. In our case, the choice-set consists of all possible learning-location decisions (with ap-
proximately 90 observed locations there are 180 alternatives). For the analysis we have con-
ducted estimations on all chosen plus four additional randomly selected alternative locations 
(without replacement), amounting to ten distinct ),( jS  choice pairs. We have also performed 
estimation on two, three, and four locations to test the robustness of our estimates in depend-
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ence of the choice size, with only negligible differences in the results. The preservation of con-
sistency is guaranteed by the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives feature of the multinomial 
logit model. At the same time, this is an important limitation of the model, since we would expect 
that “shocks” to the same learning decisions (in different locations) are correlated. In other 
words, if an immigrant is likely to learn German in location j, we would expect him to be likely to 
learn German in all other locations, too. The multinomial logit does not allow for such a correla-
tion structure.  
To relax this restriction we also estimate a multinomial probit model on the full choice set where 
the unobservable shocks may be be correlated for the same learning and location decisions. 
The respective covariance structure yields two desirable features: First, an immigrant receiving a 
high shock to learning German in one location is also likely to receive the same shock in other 
locations (the immigrant being of a specific learner-type). Second, an immigrant who has a high 
shock to “not learning in location j” is likely to have a high shock for “learning in location j” (with 
reasons drawing the immigrant to the location regardless of ethnic concentrations and learning 
costs). Estimation is slightly more complicated than in the multinomial logit case, since the 
choice probabilities in equation (5) do no longer have a closed form solution. Instead, the prob-
abilities are approximated via simulation. For details of the estimation algorithm see the Appen-
dix.  
Simulation Results  
Since estimation of the full multinomial probit model is very time-intensive, we decided to use a 
parsimonious specification of the choice model. The X in equation (1) thus include a constant, 
age at migration, years since migration, years of education, and a dummy for having obtained 
the highest educational degree in the country of origin, all of which were significant predictors of 
language proficiency in an OLS framework. The W in equation (3) contains two variables: total 
regional population which is precisely projected from the German Microcensus of the year 2000 
and normalised to one for the least populous region, and the regional unemployment rate which 
is aggregated over county data from the German Federal Employment Services. Finally, the 
payoff function in equation (3), ξ , is specified as a quadratic function in its argument, not includ-
ing a constant. As is standard, the variance of the unobservable part of utility is normalised to 
6
2π
 in the multinomial logit case. For the probit model we normalise the variance of ε  to one, 
and implicitly estimate the variance of r. Thus, we estimate nine parameters for the logit, and ten 
parameters for the probit case. Our preferred model is the probit, since it allows for a richer (and 
more realistic) covariance structure, but for comparison and because of the computational bur-
den of finding standard errors in the probit model we report results of both specifications.   
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Estimates are reported in Table 10. Both the multinomial logit and probit yield identical signs on 
all coefficients. The payoff function ξ  is concave and attains its maximum at an ethnic concen-
tration of approximately 75% in both cases. A higher unemployment rate reduces the probability 
of living in the corresponding region, whereas a larger total population size increases it. Years 
since migration and years of schooling reduce the cost of language learning, while a higher age 
at migration and a foreign educational degree increase the cost. We do not report standard er-
rors for our probit model, since we have no closed form solution for the derivative of the likeli-
hood-function, and bootstrap-methods would be too computation-intensive. However, standard 
errors from the logit model should provide some guidance for the relative importance of the vari-
ables. First, the effects of own ethnic concentration is estimated with considerable precision. 
Second, the coefficients on regional characteristics have low standard errors, too. Third, the 
coefficient on years of schooling is most precisely estimated among the learning-cost variables; 
its value suggests a prominent role of education in determining the cost of learning German. 
Both models suggest that one additional year of schooling reduces learning costs in a magni-
tude comparable to 10 to 12 additional years of residence in Germany. 
>> Table 10 about here << 
Figure 6 compares the concentration effects on the probability to learn German for the multino-
mial choice results (as given in the first part of proposition 1, that is, conditional on location) and 
an OLS regression of language proficiency (as given in our benchmark regressions reported 
earlier). It should be noted that the OLS coefficient from the 2001 sample (-0.045) is higher in 
absolute terms than the coefficient obtained from the 1985 wave (-0.037). This is consistent with 
sorting of high-learning cost immigrants into regions with high ethnic concentrations between 
1985 and 2001. As expected, the treatment effect over a wide range of concentrations is smaller 
in both choice models. For our preferred probit specification, the derivative of )|1( jSP =  at an 
own-ethnicity concentration of 3% is -3.9. Furthermore, the probit model exhibits a smaller 
treatment effect at all concentrations, whereas the logit model has higher marginal effects of 
concentration on German proficiency for lower concentrations, as can be seen by the steeper 
slope of the logit curve at low concentrations.  
>> Figure 6 about here << 
 
Counterfactuals 
Which level of language proficiency would prevail, if Germany had been able to place immi-
grants in specific regions to equalise their distribution across German regions? Or, if Germany 
had been screening guest-worker applicants by their level of education? To answer these ques-
tions we simulate four different scenarios with the help of our probit estimates: The first is the 
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“real” world. We simulate the learning and location model 500 times and compare four simulated 
moments to the actual data. The second scenario is an equal distribution of all ethnic groups 
over the country; that is replacing actual ethnic concentrations in the regions by the West-
German average (as a placement policy might have done). In the third case we increase each 
immigrant’s education by one year of schooling. Finally, we simulate a one percentage point 
increase of own-ethnic concentrations in each region.  
The main outcome of interest is the fraction of first-generation immigrants deciding to learn 
German across the different scenarios. The other three moments are plausibility checks of our 
model: we report the fraction of our sample deciding to live in the region with the largest popula-
tion, which is Berlin. Berlin is an “outlier” among all regions, with its population at least doubling 
the population of 86 out of the 87 other regions. Consequently, the capital is chosen most often 
in our benchmark simulations and the fraction of immigrants deciding to live there indicates the 
degree of clustering. A further indicator for clustering is the number of regions chosen by at least 
one observation of our sample, with 88 being the maximum. Finally, we also look at the fraction 
of immigrants in Berlin who decide to learn German.  
>> Table 11 about here << 
Results of our experiments are reported in Table 11 together with the real data moments. The 
reported numbers are averaged over 500 simulations, with standard deviations in parentheses. 
For example, 46.6% of the sample decide to learn German in our model simulation (column 1), 
coinciding almost exactly with the true fraction of German-speakers. 7.4% decide to live in Ber-
lin, out of which 44.1% learn German. The actual share of immigrants residing in Berlin in all 
immigrants in West Germany is 5.3%, so that our model slightly overestimates the attraction of 
this region. All or almost all regions are chosen by at least one immigrant in every simulation.  
When moving from those results to an equal distribution of immigrants throughout Germany, the 
effect on language proficiency is positive, but small. In other words, immigrants who are treated 
with a lower immigrant share than in the benchmark scenario are those, who had high learning 
costs to begin with. Even though the incentive has increased after equalizing the concentrations, 
only few of them are induced to learn German.  
To the opposite, the increased education scenario leads to a considerable improvement in Ger-
man proficiency. The fraction of German learners increases by 6 percentage points compared to 
the benchmark, without effecting the distribution of immigrants across Germany much. Regional 
factors (population and unemployment) largely determine the preference over regions. Berlin 
and other populous regions are chosen most often, and within those regions the share of speak-
ers increases. Of those immigrants choosing to live in Berlin, 49.7% learn German now as com-
pared to the benchmark share of 44.1%. 
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Finally, an increase in own-ethnic concentrations by one percentage point in all regions leads to 
a decrease in language proficiency by 3.8 percentage points, which is just about the change in 
the probability of learning German conditional on location. Given the near-linearity of the con-
centration effect (see Figure 6) this is not surprising: For the learning decision a common in-
crease of concentrations across regions should yield the same effect as an equivalent increase 
in the actual location while being locked in. A closer look at the choices of immigrants under this 
scenario reveals that clustering in higher-concentration areas becomes now more pronounced. 
Berlin is preferred only second most often despite its large population. More immigrants decide 
to move to a region around the city of Stuttgart20. This region comprises a population of 2 million 
inhabitants and is characterized by low unemployment and above-Berlin concentration levels for 
all ethnic groups except for Turks. The concentrations of the Turkish population in Berlin and the 
region around Stuttgart are about the same. Some immigrants who found it optimal to learn 
German are now induced not to learn, and thus the relative importance of the ethnic concentra-
tion in the settlement choice increases, making high concentration areas more of a drawing 
magnet.    
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper is the first attempt to investigate the effect of own-ethnic regional concentration on 
the language ability of labour immigrants theoretically and empirically. Using the example of the 
guest-workers who were paired with German firms exogenously, we find small but negative 
causal effects from living among immigrants from the same country of origin in the mid 1980s in 
Germany. The effect becomes slightly larger after addressing potential sorting into enclaves with 
an instrumental variable approach. We discuss several sources of measurement error and con-
clude that the instrument produces a local average treatment effect (LATE). Given the level of 
aggregation used in the analysis, our ethnic concentration effects are lower bound estimates. 
Research on more disaggregated ethnic enclaves might be desirable in order to better reflect 
immigrants’ daily life context; however, the lack of highly disaggregated data in Germany pre-
vents more profound investigations. 
 
The paper provides a simple random utility model which allows for simultaneous learning and 
location choices. Using estimated parameters to simulate the effect of own-ethnic concentration 
on language ability suggests a lower impact than estimated by a simple OLS strategy. Applying 
the model on more recent data from Germany, we find an increased tendency for immigrants to 
                                                
20 The region consists of the counties Böblingen, Esslingen, Göppingen, Ludwigsburg, and Rems-Murr-
Kreis. 
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sort into regions with co-nationals. Generally, an additional year of education increases the pro-
pensity that immigrants learn German much stronger than would a placement policy that pro-
duces equal ethnic distributions of immigrants across Germany. Despite finding a negative effect 
from own-ethnic concentration on language ability, we conclude that public policy might achieve 
better integration outcomes by targeting education levels rather than location choices. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Earnings and regional ethnic concentration (x) 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of foreign population in Germany 
 
Source: Herbert (2001), pp. 198-199, and Bauer, Dietz et al. (2005). 
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Figure 3: Absolute number of foreign population by source country 
 
Source: Herbert (2001), pp. 198-199, and Bauer, Dietz et al. (2005). 
 
Figure 4: Kernel density estimate of ethnic concentration change over time (DIFF) 
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Source: IAB employee sample 1975 and 1984; authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Correlation between own ethnic concentration and average speaking ability 
 
Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6: Estimated learning probabilities across estimators 
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Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1985; authors’ calculations.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Number of  
observations
Mean 
Speak German 2346 42.3% 
Write German 2339 45.0% 
Male 2346 55.6% 
Age at migration 2346 23.39 
Years since migration 2346 14.62 
Years of schooling 2346 9.08 
Schooling abroad 2346 83.6% 
Married 2346 78.8% 
Children in household 2346 64.4% 
Turkish 2346 34.3% 
Yugoslav 2346 19.0% 
Italian 2346 19.6% 
Spanish 2346 12.3% 
Greek 2346 14.8% 
Source: GSOEP 1985; authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of DIFF 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS 
      
Educ1 0.0013 0.0027 
 (0.0008) (0.0058) 
Educ2 -0.0001 0.0012 
 (0.0009) (0.0049) 
Educ3 0.0016 0.0094 
 (0.0037) (0.0152) 
Age -2.04E-06 2.10E-06 
 (3.85E-05) (4.00E-05) 
Turkish  0.0029** 0.0051 
 (0.0012) (0.0057) 
Italian -0.0002 -0.0013 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) 
Yugoslav 0.0037*** 0.0032 
 (0.0012) (0.0057) 
Spanish -0.0008 -0.0001 
 (0.0019) (0.0038) 
Interactions no yes 
Constant 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.0057) 
Observations 2523 2523 
R-squared 0.012 0.016 
Note: Dependent variable: DIFF = difference in ethnic concentration of individual specific region of residence between 
1975 and 1985. Omitted categories: educ4 and Greek nationals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Source: IAB 1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3: Determinants of speaking ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS First stage 2SLS 
     
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.025*** -0.037***  -0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Male  0.099*** 0.001 0.099*** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
Age at migration  -0.035*** 0.005** -0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ.  0.036*** -0.009* 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Years since migration  0.009*** -0.001 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Years of schooling  0.052*** -0.002 0.052*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.040* -0.042*** -0.040* 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Married  -0.119*** -0.027 -0.119*** 
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) 
Children in household  0.013 -0.005 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.019) 
1975 Frequency of own eth-
nic. 
  0.718***  
   (0.009)  
Constant 0.460*** 0.200** 0.459*** 0.226*** 
 (0.056) (0.080) (0.054) (0.081) 
Observations 2346 2346 2346 2346 
R-squared 0.258 0.360 0.968 0.360 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or 
not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungss-
chichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Determinants of writing ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS First stage 2SLS 
     
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.007 -0.021  -0.036** 
 (0.009) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Male  0.093*** 0.001 0.093*** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
Age at migration  -0.035*** 0.005** -0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ.  0.036*** -0.009* 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Years since migration  0.010*** -0.001 0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Years of schooling  0.066*** -0.002 0.066*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.046** -0.042*** -0.046** 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) 
Married  -0.122*** -0.027 -0.122*** 
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.026) 
Children in household  0.044** -0.005 0.043** 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) 
1975 Frequency of own 
ethnic. 
  0.718***  
   (0.009)  
Constant 0.962** 0.325 0.459*** 0.327 
 (0.415) (0.356) (0.054) (0.349) 
Observations 2339 2339 2339 2339 
R-squared 0.257 0.378 0.968 0.377 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of writing ability (Writing very good or good = 1, writing fair, poor or not at all 
= 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West 
Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 
1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: Determinants of speaking ability; robustness check with alternative enclave measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
  
Number of members of ethnicity -0.036***  -0.053***
 (0.012)  (0.016)
Dissimilarity index -1.471***  -2.776**
 (0.498)  (1.137)
Log of Isolation index -0.015* -0.085**
 (0.008) (0.035)
Male 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.096***
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036***
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037***
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008***
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.052***
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Schooling abroad -0.040* -0.035 -0.036 -0.040* -0.033 -0.042*
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Married -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.117***
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Children in household 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.012
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Constant 0.743*** -0.989* -0.948* 0.846*** -1.147** -2.058***
 (0.112) (0.573) (0.576) (0.137) (0.585) (0.786)
Observations 2346 2282 2278 2346 2282 2278
Instrument no no no yes yes yes
R-squared 0.361 0.309 0.307 0.360 0.306 0.281
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). Instrument: 1975 Frequency of own 
ethnicity. All regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects. Regressions (1), (4) and (5) control for fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany, 
all other regressions control for regional unemployment rate and log of regional income level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6: Determinants of speaking ability; robustness checks and extensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Five-scale ordinal variable 
 
Binary variable: Speaking 
 
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.078*** -0.064**     
 (0.019) (0.027)     
Enclave (Own ethnic concentration above 
p75) 
  -0.040* 0.002 -0.060** 0.032 
   (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.038) 
Frequency of Germans below p75    0.086***   
    (0.028)   
Enclave*Freq. of Germans below p75    -0.131***   
    (0.044)   
Immigrated at young age (16 or below)     0.066  
     (0.043)  
Enclave*Immigrated at young age (16 or 
below) 
    0.085**  
     (0.044)  
Immigrated as adult      -0.060 
      (0.042) 
Enclave*Immigrated as adult      -0.099** 
      (0.043) 
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Male  0.214*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
  (0.033) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age at migration  -0.058*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age at migration squ.  0.031** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
  (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years since migration  0.031*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of schooling  0.118*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.046 -0.040* -0.043* -0.055** -0.057** 
  (0.048) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married  -0.309*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.111*** 
  (0.052) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Children in household  -0.010 -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 
  (0.038) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 4.086*** 3.063*** -1.031* -0.984* -1.141** -1.049* 
 (0.132) (0.156) (0.571) (0.562) (0.565) (0.559) 
Observations 2346 2346 2282 2340 2340 2340 
R-squared 0.324 0.454 0.308 0.316 0.315 0.316 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity 
fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7: Results with alternative and multiple instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Reduced 
form 
Reduced 
form 
       
Frequency of own ethnicity (instrumented) -0.039*** -0.068** -0.040*** -0.034**   
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.014)   
1975 Frequency of own ethnicity; (1)     -0.028***  
     (0.011)  
SPD election result; (2)      -0.025** 
      (0.011) 
Male 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of schooling 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad -0.039*** -0.040* -0.039*** -0.039* -0.037 -0.038* 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
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 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Children in household 0.011* 0.009 0.011* 0.011 0.011 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant -1.949*** -1.852** -1.947*** -1.967** -1.319 -0.679 
 (0.514) (0.800) (0.514) (1.000) (1.091) 
 
(1.042) 
Instruments (1) (2) rank(1),  
rank(2) 
(2) and interac-
tion rank(2)*
pop size 
  
Number of instruments 1 1 2 60   
Hanson overidentification test, p-value — — 0.959 0.163   
Observations 2340 2340 2340 2340 2340 2340 
R-squared 0.364 0.362 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.362 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). Instrument (1) is the own-ethnic 
concentration of the year 1975. Instrument (2) is the election outcome of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the 1976 national elections. Note that 
there are six missing observations for instrument (2). Therefore all regressions are performed on a slightly smaller sample than in Table 3, which explains the 
small differences in estimates. Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1975/1985 and official results of the Bundestag elections 1976; 
authors’ calculations. 
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Table 8: Propensity score matching results 
 
Treatment Variable 
(1) Sample Treated Controls Difference s.e. T-stat
Frequency > 75p Unmatched 0.393 0.431 -0.038 (0.025) -1.51
 One neighbour 0.391 0.454 -0.063 (0.043) -1.45
 Two neighbours 0.391 0.485 -0.093 (0.038) -2.47
 Three neighbours 0.391 0.479 -0.087 (0.036) -2.42
 Four neighbours 0.391 0.462 -0.071 (0.035) -2.01
    
Treatment Variable 
(2) Sample Treated Controls Difference s.e. T-stat
Dissimilarity index > 
p75 Unmatched 0.378 0.428 -0.051 (0.033) -1.53
 One neighbour 0.378 0.486 -0.108 (0.052) -2.08
 Two neighbours 0.378 0.454 -0.076 (0.046) -1.67
 Three neighbours 0.378 0.474 -0.096 (0.043) -2.24
 Four neighbours 0.378 0.458 -0.080 (0.041) -1.95
Note: Nearest neighbour matching using propensity score matching, probit estimation of propensity score. Propensity 
score estimation includes standard covariates (see Table 1). Number of observations is 2,346. For first treat-
ment variable, three observations are off-support, for second treatment all observations are on support. Source: 
GSOEP 1985, IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9: Heterogeneous effect by year of moving to current place of residence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 With full in-
formation on 
year of move
1985 
Move before 
1982 
Move before 
1979 
Move before 
1975 
Move before 
1970 
      
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.036** -0.057*** -0.093*** -0.068** -0.191*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.069) 
Male 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.138*** 0.075 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.068) 
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.017 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) 
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.030* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) 
Schooling abroad -0.043* -0.042* -0.023 -0.040 0.057 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.044) (0.105) 
Married -0.125*** -0.096*** -0.134*** -0.123** -0.253* 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.041) (0.053) (0.131) 
Children in household 0.012 0.005 -0.019 -0.014 0.034 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.090) 
Constant 0.163* 0.222* 0.534*** 0.637*** 1.327*** 
 (0.098) (0.133) (0.097) (0.153) (0.473) 
Observations 2289 2000 1362 784 222 
R-squared 0.361 0.375 0.391 0.428 0.507 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or 
not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschich-
ten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 
1984-85 and IAB 1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10: Multinomial Choice estimates of payoff function ξ , regional pull and push fac-
tors, and cost of learning German 
 (1) (2) 
  Logit Probit 
Quadratic -19.1728 -7.4106 
 (1.401)  
Linear 27.9283 11.1724 
  (1.3668)   
Unemployment -0.1139 -0.0551 
 (0.0135)  
Population 0.1966 0.1084 
  (0.0168)   
Constant 10.0109 4.7767 
 (0.8761)  
Age at migraton 0.0847 0.0493 
 (0.0576)  
Years since migration -0.0241 -0.0188 
 (0.0781)  
Years of schooling -0.297 -0.1904 
 (0.1341)  
Schooling abroad 0.5863 0.3608 
  (1.8063)   
LL -2061.3 -4781.0 
LL ratio index 0.1206 0.0917 
Note: Estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Sandwich standard errors in parentheses. The first two estimates refer to 
parameters a and b in the payoff function xbxax ∗+∗= 2)(ξ .  
Source: GSOEP 2001; authors’ calculations 
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Table 11: Counterfactual simulations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Benchmark
Equal distribu-
tion 
More educa-
tion 
Higher con-
centration Data 
German speakers 
(%) 46.6% 48.2% 52.6% 42.8% 46.8% 
 (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3)  
Living in Berlin (%) 7.4% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 5.3% 
 (0.85) (0.86) (0.84) (0.83)  
German speakers in 
Berlin (%) 44.1% 47.4% 49.7% 40.2% 71.4% 
 (5.7) (5.8) (5.8) (5.7)  
Regions with at least 
one immigrant 87.4 87.0 87.4 87.4 88 
 (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.8)  
Note: Means from 500 simulations on a sample of 1,018 immigrants. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Source: GSOEP 2001; authors’ calculations. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 10/2010 47 
Appendix  
Proof of proposition 1: 
 
1. The probability of learning German conditional on location j is: 
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3. The probability of moving to k is: 
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4. The unconditional probability of speaking German is: 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
We need to show: 




∂
=∂
>
∂
∂
=+
∂
∂
=+


 =∂
=⇔




∂
=∂
>



∂
∂
=+
∂
=∂
→→
≠→→→
→→→


j
f
xj
f
x
jk
j
f
xj
f
xx
j
f
xk
j
f
xj
f
x
x
jSP
x
jPjSP
x
kPkSP
x
jSPjSP
x
jSP
x
kPkSPjP
x
jSP
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
)|1(lim)()|1(lim
)()|1(lim)|1(lim),1(lim
)|1(lim)()|1(lim)()|1(lim
00
000
000
 
 
since 0),0(lim
0
==
→
jSP
j
fx
 is implied by assumption 2. With 1)|1(lim
0
==
→
jSP
j
fx
 and 

≠ ∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
jk
j
f
j
f x
kP
x
jP )()(
: 




∂
=∂
>



−=
∂
∂
+


 =∂
=⇔
→≠→→→
 j
f
xjk
j
f
xj
f
xx x
jSPkSP
x
kP
x
jSPjSP
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
f
)|1(lim)1)|1(()(lim)|1(lim),1(lim
0000
 
which holds since 
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Since ξ  is differentiable, there is a neighbourhood around jfx  for which the inequality holds. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Estimation of the simulated multinomial probit model 
If we assume the random variables ( ji
j
i r,ε ) to be i.i.d. normal with standard deviations rσσ ε , , 
the model to be estimated is a multinomial probit. The mean vector can be set to zero without 
loss of generality, since the X in equation (1) contain a constant and the choice of one location 
over another is not affected by a level shift of utilities. To understand our estimation routine, con-
sider a choice-set with two locations: we can stack the alternatives as “location 1, not learn”, “lo-
cation 1, learn”, “location 2, not learn”, and “location 2, learn”. Suppressing the individual index 
and letting the unobserved learning cost ε  be location-independent, the corresponding random 
vector of ω  and its variance-covariance matrix are: 
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The estimation algorithm for the two times k choices (for k regions) consists of the following steps 
(see Train (2003) for a discussion of simulation-based estimations of multinomial choice models): 
1. Construct the ( )kk 22 ×  matrix L such that )(Ω=VLLT . This ensures positive 
definiteness of the variance matrix. L consists of two distinct elements (apart from the ze-
ros). One of them is normalised such that 1=εσ , since rσ  and εσ  are not separately 
identified. 
2. For every observation, draw a vector of two times k random numbers from the joint 
normal distribution ( ))(,0 ΩVN . Calculate all ),( jSU from equation (3).  
3. To have a smooth probability (rather than a step-function by just counting the 
number of times an alternative is chosen), calculate  
=
=
}1,0{ ),(
),(
)/exp(
)/exp(
s k ks
jS
U
U
R λ
λ
 where 
λ  can be any number between zero and one.  
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 N times and average the N “probabilities” R to obtain 
=∧ RNP )/1( , an approximation to equation (5).  
 
Importantly, the random numbers drawn for each individual should remain constant over all itera-
tions of the maximization routine. We have set the number of simulation steps N to 20,000. The 
higher we set N, the closer we approximate the “true” probabilities, at the cost of longer computa-
tion time. All estimations are performed with maximum likelihood on the (simulated) probabilities. 
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